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A body schema is an agent's model of its own body that enables it to act on a®ordances in the
environment. This paper presents a body schema system for the Learning Intelligent Decision
Agent (LIDA) cognitive architecture. LIDA is a conceptual and computational implementation
of Global Workspace Theory, also integrating other theories from neuroscience and psychology.
This paper contends that the ‘body schema' should be split into three separate functions based
on the functional role of consciousness in Global Workspace Theory. There is (1) an online model
of the agent's e®ectors and e®ector variables (Current Body Schema), (2) a long-term,
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recognitional storage of embodied capacities for action and a®ordances (Habitual Body Schema),
and (3) \dorsal" stream information feeding directly from early perception to sensorimotor
processes (Online Body Schema). This paper then discusses how the LIDA model of the body
schema explains several experiments in psychology and ethology.
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1. Introduction
An autonomous agent is a \system situated within, and a part of, an environment,
that senses that environment and acts on it, over time, in pursuit of its own agenda,
and so as to a®ect what it senses in the future" [Franklin and Graesser, 1997, p. 25].
An agent that is situated or embedded in an environment must perceive a®ordances
that are relevant to its own embodied capacities. For example, a cat does not perceive
a graspabilitya a®ordance when it sees a mug with a handle, while a human can. An
agent must also pursue an agenda that is appropriate to its embodiment. A human
cannot pursue a task of °ying around the sky and catching prey to eat, while a bat
can. Although humans have had the option of using aircraft or gliders to °y since the
20th century, this is a highly costly, restrictive, and ine±cient means of procuring
food. Humans do not have the right kind of embodiment or e®ectors to make °ying a
reasonable method of ¯nding nourishment, yet this comes naturally to bats who do
have the right bodies for the task.
In order to perceive a®ordances, and pursue an agenda appropriate to the agent's
embodiment, the agent uses a body schema, which is a model of its own embodiment
[Haggard and Wolpert, 2005]. The model of the body includes its embodied
capacities, properties of its body, and the current positions of its body, limbs, and
digits (or whatever the agent's e®ectors may be). It is not the entire body that is
modeled. The agent does not need to model its digestive system, or its own nervous
system functions. It needs a model of everything relevant to its performance of
actions in the world, such as its posture, e®ectors, and size. \The primary function of
an autonomous agent is to continually and iteratively answer the question, ‘What do
I do next?'" [Franklin, 1995, p. 412]. The body schema is a central tool by means of
which an agent answers that question. The a®ordances that the agent perceives, the
actions it takes, and the agenda it pursues are all relative to this body schema. This is
consistent with the enactive approach, where the agent actively brings forth or enacts
its world, based on its autonomy but is structurally coupled to that world, rather
than passively representing it [Franklin, 1995; Varela et al., 1991/2016].
The body schema must not be confused with the body image, especially given the
deep historical con°ation of the two terms [Gallagher, 2005]. Body image can refer to
two related ideas. First, body image includes semantic representations of one's
attractiveness, strength (e.g., being muscular), weight (e.g., overweight, under-
weight), race, and similar socially relevant judgments about one's own body. It is in
aA®ordances have traditionally been marked o® linguistically by the postposition-ability: e.g., grasp-
ability, turn-ability, or bite-ability [Gibson, 1979/2015].
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this sense that the term is typically used in social psychology. Disorders of this body
image include anorexia, bulimia, and body dysmorphic disorder, and muscle dys-
morphia. This sense of body image has been primarily studied in humans. Second,
body image can refer to the conscious perception of the body. Body schema, on the
other hand, is largely kinesthetic or proprioceptive. Its disorders include deaf-
ferentation, phantom limb syndrome, and alien hand syndrome.
While the literature on body schema tends to speak about it as a uni¯ed construct,
we believe the body schema serves three quite di®erent functions (see Fig. 1). The
Current Body Schema is a model of the agent's e®ectors and e®ector variables, such
as current e®ector positions. For example, for a human agent, the Current Body
Schema would model bodily posture, orientation, limb, and digit positions, as well as
those of e®ectors used in language production such as the tongue and lips. This model
is continually updated and, although it is typically not conscious, if the agent attends
to it, parts of it can be brought into consciousness. The Habitual Body Schema, on the
other hand, is a uni¯ed collection of the agent's innate and learned bodily capacities
for action and a®ordances. For example, a human agent may know it has the ability
to ski or turn a door handle, and it may know several properties of its body such as
how heavy it is (e.g., \Can I jump across these two rocks?") or how tall it is (e.g.,
\Can I ¯t through this doorway?"). This collection of embodied capacities for action
is a form of stored long-term memory that can be cued and regularly updated.
Finally, the Online Body Schema is realized as \dorsal" stream information in early
perceptual processes, which is never-conscious [Franklin and Baars, 2010], and
directly modulates sensorimotor processes.b Body image refers to other semantic and
visual aspects of the body, and is not part of the body schema.
Our primary contribution in this paper is to outline a conceptual implementation
of the body schema in Learning Intelligent Decision Agent (LIDA), an embodied and
Fig. 1. The three functions of the body schema and the body image. The literature on the body schema
does not typically distinguish between these di®erent functions of the body schema. This ¯ne-grained
analysis allows us to account for a broader range of cognitive phenomena.
b In humans, this processing pathway is not literally dorsal, but it is analogous to the dorsal visual stream
(see Sec. 1.1). LIDA's dorsal stream is a sensory pathway from Sensory Memory to the Sensory Motor
System (see Fig. 3).
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situated cognitive architecture. Additionally, we distinguish between three separate
functions for what the literature identi¯es as ‘the body schema'. This distinction is
based on the functional role of consciousness in Global Workspace Theory, and we
believe our distinction ought generally to hold beyond the speci¯c modeling concerns
of LIDA. We also discuss how the LIDA model of the body schema helps to explain
several experiments in psychology and ethology.
In contrast to cognitive models that seek to explain speci¯c aspects of cognition,
such as working memory [Baddeley, 2007], LIDA is a comprehensive, systems-level,
cognitive model and agent architecture that strives to be a \uni¯ed theory of
cognition" [Newell, 1990]. While a disadvantage of doing so is that it makes the model
highly complex, it has the advantage of integrating a broad range of cognitive
phenomena, while also specifying how they function interdependently. LIDA
implements and °eshes out signi¯cant portions of the Global Workspace Theory of
consciousness [Baars, 1988, 2019], as well as several other psychological and neu-
roscienti¯c theories including the perception-action cycle [Cutsuridis et al., 2011;
Dijkstra et al., 1994; Freeman, 2002; Neisser, 1976], perceptual symbol systems
[Barsalou, 1999], appraisal theory [Scherer, 2001], long-term working memory
[Ericsson and Kintsch, 1995], among others. It is also broadly consistent with
embodied cognition [Gallagher, 2005; Varela et al., 1991/2016], nonlinear, self-
organizing neural dynamics [Freeman, 2000; Kelso, 1995; Kozma and Freeman,
2016], and Dynamic Field Theory [Erlhagen and Sch€oner, 2002; Sch€oner, 2008; see
Franklin et al., 2013, 2014, 2016].
We continue the introduction with a brief overview of the concept of body schema,
including the neuropsychological evidence (Sec. 1.1). Next, we brie°y describe the
LIDA cognitive architecture and its cognitive cycle (Sec. 2), followed by our con-
ceptual implementation of the body schema in LIDA (Sec. 3). We discuss the relation
of the body image to the body schema (Sec. 3.3). We examine the plasticity of the
Current Body Schema and its relation to the phenomenon of phantom limbs (Sec. 4).
Finally, we describe several experiments related to the body schema, and show how
LIDA helps to explain their results (Sec. 5).
1.1. The history and neuropsychological underpinnings
of the body schema
The concept of body schema is often traced to Head and Holmes' [1911] early work on
brain lesions, although it was pre¯gured in the work of Bonnier [1900]. Bonnier
argued that a stable sense of posture (sens d'attitudes) persisted despite the rapid
changes in somatosensory information. Munk [1890] earlier posited the existence of
\images" of posture and movement recorded in the brain, allowing for the smooth,
syncopated coordination and movement of the body. Head and Holmes reject the
notion that visual images of the body (which is today one of the meanings of the term
body image) serve to guide sensorimotor action. Referring to a patient who appears to
be dea®erented, they remark that when this person closes their eyes, they lose all
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sense of where their arm may be if you change its position. The sense that is lost in
this patient is proprioception or kinesthesia. But proprioception is simply a sense
modality. Just as the visual modality helps to build up a model of the world, they
thought the proprioceptive information helped to build a model of the body.
\By means of perpetual alterations in position we are always building up a
postural model of ourselves which constantly changes. Every new posture
or movement is recorded on this plastic schema, and the activity of the
cortex brings every fresh group of sensations evoked by altered posture into
relation with it" [Head and Holmes, 1911, p. 187].
While today we may associate the term \posture" with the way one carries their
spine, Head and Holmes were referring to the position and movement of the body and
its limbs. The subsequent literature uses the term body schema. Head and Holmes
emphasize that it is only in virtue of this model that the agent is able move, act, and
manipulate objects. Mere proprioceptive feedback is not in itself enough, in the same
way that visual information from the retinas is not by itself enough to produce a
visual scene. The agent needs a knowledge of its embodied capacities and a model of
its body and limb positions. This kind of knowledge is what philosophers call know-
how [Ryle, 1949/2009]. It is not propositional, but is instead practical, embodied, and
intuitive. For example, knowing that I can ¯t through a doorway is a type of know-
how, while knowing that I am 172 cm tall is not. In Head and Holmes' view, the body
schema is nonconscious, in contrast to the body image which is conscious.
Merleau-Ponty [1945/2012] ¯rst emphasized the aspect of habit or know-how in
the body schema. \[T]he subject does not weld together individual movements and
individual stimuli but acquires the power to respond with a certain type of solution to
situations of a certain general form" [p. 164]. These habits, as well as a sense of bodily
size, undergirds for example the way we are able to move through a doorway
\without checking the width of the doorway against that of my body" [p. 165].
Merleau-Ponty also emphasizes that the body schema is marked by egocentrically
coded peripersonal space. Following a suggestion from Head and Holmes, Merleau-
Ponty proposes that phantom limb syndrome is underlain by the undue persistence of
the body schema. A phantom limb arises when a limb is amputated but the body
schema erroneously continues to model that limb despite the objective absence of
proprioceptive feedback.
Gallagher argues that the body schema is a \system of sensory-motor capacities
that function without awareness or the necessity of perceptual monitoring" [2005,
p. 24]. Although it is largely nonconscious, it can be brought to consciousness.
For example, we may not be aware of the movement of our legs while walking.
When not in motion, we may have no awareness at all of our body and limb positions
[Jeannerod, 2010]. We can, however, shift our attention to them and gain awareness
of their movement and positions.
The neuropsychological underpinnings of the body schema include separate
action and perception streams in somatosensory perception [de Vignemont, 2010;
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Ho®mann et al., 2010; Paillard, 1999]. The action stream is martialed in service of
movement, which is ultimately the purpose of the body schema. The perception
stream is used for identifying areas of the body. Vision is well-known to have two
visual pathways: (1) the dorsal stream, or \how" pathway, a nonconscious stream
processing action-guided perception, and (2) the ventral stream, or \what" pathway,
a largely conscious stream for object categorization and scene perception [Goodale
and Milner, 1992; Ungerleider and Mishkin, 1982]. Other sensory modalities have an
analogous organization, including hearing [Kaas and Hackett, 1999] and somato-
sensory perception, including touch and proprioception. The equivalent of the ven-
tral visual stream, a pathway from the anterior parietal cortex (APC) to the
secondary somatosensory cortex (SII) to the posterior insula, underlies object rec-
ognition through touch, and processing of the tactile aspects of body image. Body
image is also underlain by the ventral visual stream itself. The equivalent of the
dorsal visual stream, a pathway from the thalamus to the posterior parietal cortex,
underlies the body schema [Dijkerman and De Haan, 2007]. Although the sensory
mechanisms underlying the body schema are known, it is not fully understood how
the brain converts the contents of the action stream into a model of the body [Longo
et al., 2010].
Bimodal neurons in the premotor cortex, intraparietal cortex, and the putamen
code for both a body part's somatosensory receptive ¯eld and the visual receptive
¯eld immediately around that part [Duhamel et al., 1998; Fogassi et al., 1996;
Graziano et al., 1994]. These neurons play an important role in the plasticity of the
body schema. Head and Holmes say, \a woman's power of localization may extend to
the feather in her hat" [1911, p. 188]. Although a rather dated example, what they
mean is that such a woman would have an immediate sense of her extended bodily
height, having no di±culty negotiating doorways. Merleau-Ponty [1945/2012] gives
the example of a blind man with a cane. The blind man, Merleau-Ponty claims, does
not experience the cane as an intermediary between himself and the world. Rather, he
has the sense of a direct perception of the world that is being tapped and touched in
front of him, as if the cane were an extension of his body. Maravita and Iriki [2004]
¯nd that neural representations of the body extend to incorporate tools in macaques.
They recorded bimodal neurons in the intraparietal cortex, where visual and soma-
tosensory modalities are combined. After two weeks of training with a tool for
grabbing food, the visual and somatosensory receptive ¯elds of the macaque bimodal
neurons expanded to integrate habitual tool use. In Fig. 2 below, distal neurons code
for the hand (and later the hand-tool extension), while proximal neurons code for arm
reach (and later the arm-tool extended reach).
In humans, the body schema integrates proprioception and the vestibular sense of
balance, also integrating visual, tactile, and auditory information, producing a model
of the agent's own body [Ho®mann et al., 2010]. Despite a sharp dissociation between
body image (as conscious visual percepts of the body) and body schema [Gallagher,
2005], the latter integrates multimodal information to help it update.
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LIDA distinguishes between three di®erent functions that subserve what in the
broader literature is uni¯ed under the label of ‘body schema': (1) Current Body
Schema, (2) Habitual Body Schema, and (3) Online Body Schema (see Fig. 1).
Henceforth, we will use the term ‘body schema' to mean the set containing these
three components. Our distinction is not merely a modeling decision relevant to the
LIDA cognitive architecture. We base this distinction on the functional role of
consciousness in Global Workspace Theory.
According to Global Workspace Theory, consciousness in humans and some other
animals [Boly et al., 2013] broadcasts contents to distributed networks in the brain.
In this way, information that is not otherwise available to regional brain networks is
made available to them [Baars, 2019; Dehaene, 2014; Mashour et al., 2020]. Global
Workspace Theory proposes the Conscious Learning Hypothesis, viz. that
\signi¯cant learning takes place via the interaction of consciousness with the various
memory systems" [Franklin et al., 2013, p. 10]. Unconscious \learning," such
as priming, is not labeled as ‘learning' in this context because it is not considered a
route to signi¯cant learning, but it is still accounted for [Franklin et al., 2013, 2016;
Fig. 2. Evidence of the plasticity of the body schema. Reprinted from Maravita and Iriki [2004, p. 80] with
permission.
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Kugele and Franklin, forthcoming]. The broadcast is mediated by thetagamma
coupling of neural assemblies across the brain [Baars et al., 2013; Strain et al., in
preparation; Varela et al., 2001]. Essentially, local neural assemblies distributed
across regional networks are entrained by the mediation of long-¯ber pyramidal
neurons, causing a nonlinear bifurcation of brain activity into a state of global
synchronization, and simultaneously inhibiting other neural assemblies [Kozma and
Freeman, 2016]. The Current Body Schema  i.e., the proprioceptive and ves-
tibular model of the body  is continually updated, however, meaning that it
cannot rely on periodic conscious broadcasts to update. Furthermore, most of its
updates are unconscious. If it were updated through conscious broadcasts, that
would imply that we would be continually phenomenally conscious of the entirety
of our bodily movements, positions, and microadjustments, which is plainly false.
The Habitual Body Schema, on the other hand, does not require continuous
updating, and can learn in the typical way, through conscious broadcasts (see
Sec. 2). For example, when we learn to drive, we learn to recognize new a®ordances.
To learn these new a®ordances, however, we must ¯rst pass through a learning
stage involving intense concentration and conscious focus. Finally, \dorsal" stream
information is never-conscious, but it allows agents to make ¯ne, online adjust-
ments as an action is being performed [Gallagher, 2005]. In sum, we believe that our
distinction of the ‘body schema' into three separate functions ought to hold beyond
the speci¯c case of LIDA, as it is based upon the general functional role of con-
sciousness in Global Workspace Theory.
Fig. 3. Schematic of the LIDA cognitive architecture.
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2. The LIDA Cognitive Architecture
LIDA is an embodied, situated, and functionally conscious cognitive architecture. It
is based on IDA, a software agent developed for the US Navy [Franklin et al., 1998].
LIDA is a conceptual and partly computational, implementation and °eshing out of
Global Workspace Theory [Baars, 1988, 2019]. LIDA models minds, both biological
and arti¯cial, which are de¯ned as \control structures for autonomous agents"
[Franklin, 1995, p. 412]. LIDA agents are autonomous agents with control structures
based on the LIDA architecture and its conceptual commitments. LIDA agents have
been created for both scienti¯c (e.g., attempting to replicate a psychological exper-
iment) [Madl and Franklin, 2012; McCall, 2014] and engineering (e.g., controlling a
robot) [Dong and Franklin, 2015] pursuits. Depending on the task domain and needs,
a LIDA agent may not implement all elements of the LIDA modules. LIDA can be
used to model both humans and non-humans and, in this paper, we will often refer to
implementations of former as \human agents". In this section, we provide a brief
overview of the LIDA model, focusing on the emergence of cognitive cycles, the role of
consciousness, and the modulesc most relevant to the body schema. For a fuller
overview, see Franklin et al. [2016].
In LIDA, cognition arises from cognitive cycles, which are akin to the action-
perception cycles referred to by many psychologists and neuroscientists [Cutsuridis
et al., 2011; Dijkstra et al., 1994; Freeman, 2002; Neisser, 1976]. In this context,
‘cognition' refers broadly not only to higher order cognition, but also to basic perceptual
and motor processes. Cognitive cycles emerge as LIDA's cognitive modules receive,
process, and send information,where each cycle conceptually beginswith perception and
ends with the execution of an action. Most of LIDA's modules operate asynchronously,
that is, they do not explicitly synchronize their operationswith othermodules; therefore,
cognitive cycles typically overlap. They are divided into three phases: (1) the perception
and understanding phase, (2) the attention phase, and (3) the action and learning phase.
A single cognitive cycle in a human typically takes place in on the order of 260390ms,
with conscious broadcast happening around 200280ms after the onset of the stimulus
[Madl et al., 2011]. The timing involved is consistent with neuroscienti¯c evidence of
thetagamma coupling of neuronal populations from sensory to corticothalamic regions
[Doesburg et al., 2009; Varela et al., 2001].
2.1. The perception and understanding phase
A single cognitive cycle begins with the perception and understanding phase, which
starts along with stimulus onset. For a LIDA agent modeling humans, this typically
takes 80100ms to initiate. A sensory stimulus is ¯rst processed in Sensory Memory,
which is a rapidly decaying memory, but with high storage capacity. It has only the
most basic of feature detectors. Both neural networks [He et al., 2015; Kugele and
Franklin, 2020; Madl et al., 2014] and cortical learning algorithms [Agrawal and
cThe modular structure of LIDA does not necessarily imply a modular view of the brain.
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Franklin, 2014; Hawkins et al., 2010] have been explored as implementations of Sensory
Memory. Ventral stream visual information from Sensory Memory is sent to the pre-
conscious Workspace, as well as to Perceptual Associative Memory (PAM). The pre-
conscious Workspace is a form of short-term memory; it is not conscious per se but
some of its contents can be brought to consciousness [Franklin and Baars, 2010].
Structure building codelets monitor the preconscious Workspace for items that are
relevant to their concerns, and they assemble structures. In the Current Situational
Model (CSM), a submodule of the preconscious Workspace, structure building codelets
assemble structures that model the environment and certain aspects of the agent's
current situation, such as options and emotions. It is a form of short-term memory, and
the model of the agent's situation often changes as its environment changes.
Structure-building codelets build structures using input originating from Sensory
Memory, memories cued from long-term memory modules (PAM, Spatial Memory,
Transient Episodic Memory (TEM), and Declarative Memory), and representations
constructed by other structure-building codelets. PAM, based on the CopyCat
architecture [Hofstadter and Mitchell, 1994], receives ventral streamd information
from Sensory Memory as percepts are activated, instantiated, and sent to the CSM.
PAM's primary task is recognition. One of its primary data structures is the event,
typically comprised of agent, action, and object thematic links, and sometimes
others. Spatial Memory stores allocentric spatial maps (egocentric spatiality is
modeled within the CSM). TEM stores autobiographical memories that decay away
within the span of a few hours or a day [Conway, 2001; Franklin et al., 2005].
Declarative Memory stores autobiographical memories that have been consolidated
from TEM (for example, during REM sleep), as well as semantic memories that are
autobiographical memories that have lost their place and time contexts.
2.2. The attention phase
The next phase of the cognitive cycle is the attention phase, wherein attention
codelets form coalitions, and compete for a conscious broadcast, which in humans
typically begins around 200280ms after stimulus onset. Like structure building
codelets, attention codelets monitor the CSM for their speci¯c concerns, such as
loud, bright, dangerous, relevant, urgent, and important objects [Faghihi et al.,
2012]. Attention codelets contribute to consciousness' function as a saliency ¯lter,
and allow only the most salient structures to compete for the global broadcast. The
structures built by structure building codelets can be further included in coalitions
by attention codelets. Coalitions contain one or more structures that are advocated
for by one or more attention codelets, which are assigned an overall activation
dIn LIDA, the ventral stream of information is de¯ned as multimodal information used for representation.
The dorsal stream is de¯ned as multimodal information used for online adjustment of the Sensory Motor
System. They loosely correspond to the ventral and dorsal visual streams of the human brain, but they are
not limited to one modality and they are not necessarily neural pathways (e.g., they can be properties of
arti¯cial agents).
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based on the activation of the attention codelet, the activation of its component
structures, the degree to which the structure matches the codelet's concern, as well
as the modulatory e®ects of a refractory period [Madl and Franklin, 2012].
Coalitions are sent to the Global Workspace, where they compete for the conscious
broadcast [Baars, 2019; Baars et al., 2013]. While most modules are asynchronous,
the competition for the global broadcast within the Global Workspace is syn-
chronous, and it is initiated by one of several triggers [Kaur, 2011]. For example,
when a coalition over a certain activation threshold arrives, a global broadcast is
triggered.
Content in the global broadcast is considered \functionally consciousness"
content; that is, it is made globally available to all LIDA's modules and processes,
though each module and process is free to ignore that content based on its own
concerns. This corresponds to the human evidence of a phase shift in neural
dynamics during conscious cognition [Kozma and Freeman, 2016], wherein
distributed neural assemblies across the brain temporarily synchronize through
thetagamma coupling [Baars et al., 2013; Strain et al., in preparation]. Overall,
the agent's model of the world and of its body, as well as the plans, memories, and
imaginings surrounding those models, remain overwhelmingly unconscious (i.e., in
the preconscious Workspace). The agent is only conscious of a very small portion of
that material in the form of the contents of the winning coalition at any given point
in time.
2.3. The action and learning phase
The ¯nal phase of the cognitive cycle is the action and learning phase, wherein the
conscious broadcast leads to a process of action selection, as well as pro°igate
learning in a majority of the modules. In humans, this begins 60110ms from the
initiation of conscious broadcast [Madl et al., 2011]. The choice of an action begins as
conscious content is used to recruit schemes in Procedural Memory. Schemes are
Procedural Memory's primary data structure, and they consist of a context, an
action, and a result. Upon receipt of a conscious broadcast, schemes can be instan-
tiated using the conscious content to ¯ll out the details of the context, action, and
result. Instantiated schemes, called behaviors, are then sent to Action Selection.
Action Selection then chooses a behavior. Under some circumstances, the selection of
a behavior may require deliberation, such as when two possible behaviors have equal
weighting; this pushes behavior selection to further cognitive cycles (multi-cyclic
deliberation is achieved through ideomotor theory [Franklin, 2000; James, 1890/
1983]). Once a behavior is selected, it is sent to Sensory Motor Memory, which
generates a motor plan to realize the action of the behavior. The motor plan is then
sent to Motor Plan Execution. Pro°igate learning also occurs as a result of the
conscious broadcast: attentional, procedural, episodic, spatial, perceptual, beha-
vioral, sensory motor, and other types of learning [Franklin et al., 2013, 2016; Kugele
and Franklin, forthcoming]. This accords with the conscious learning hypothesis of
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Global Workspace Theory, which states that signi¯cant learning (excluding priming)
occurs only during conscious broadcasts [Baars, 1988, 2019]. Information from the
Current Body Schema, when broadcast, can be used by Procedural Memory, Action
Selection, Sensory Motor Memory, and Motor Plan Execution  potentially, by any
of LIDA's modules and processes. In this way, the body schema supports action and
movement.
3. The Body Schema in LIDA
LIDA makes a distinction between three functions subserving what in the broader
literature are labeled \body schema" (see Figs. 1 and 4).
(1) The Current Body Schema. It is a continually updated model of postural and
e®ector positions, e®ected in terms of e®ector variables and their values. In
humans, it is primarily built out of proprioceptive and vestibular feedback, but
visual feedback can in°uence its states. It is typically preconscious but parts of it
can be brought to consciousness. The module is a system composed of a long-
term memory component holding e®ector variables, and a short-term memory
component holding rapidly updated values for those variables.
(2) The Habitual Body Schema. It is a uni¯ed collection of bodily and e®ector
capacities for action, learned a®ordances, accustomed weight, and accustomed
size. It is a form of long-term memory. It is preconscious and stored largely in
Fig. 4. The place of the three functions of the body schema in LIDA's cognitive cycle.
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PAM, from whence it can be cued into the CSM and from there possibly brought
to consciousness.
(3) The Online Body Schema. It consists of \dorsal" stream information sent
directly from Sensory Memory to the Sensory Motor System. Since it bypasses
conscious broadcast, taking a shortcut straight from early sensory processes to
late motor performance, it allows for the rapid sensorimotor adjustments that
are critical to smooth motor performance in the world.
Body image, on the other hand, is an umbrella term capturing the variegated
aspects of the body that are represented in linguistic, visual, auditory, and other
modalities. Nonhuman LIDA agents may have only a limited body image composed
of visual and other sensory information. This is because many nonhuman animals and
arti¯cial agents have little capacity for semantic knowledge of their attractiveness
and other bodily attributes that are social in nature. LIDA agents without a body,
such as IDA [Franklin et al., 1998], may need neither a body image nor a body
schema. In humans, the body image is composed of ventral stream visual information,
the somatosensory \ventral" stream from the APC to the SII to the posterior insula
(see Sec. 1.1), semantic knowledge of the body, and socially relevant representations
of the body. For humans, the semantic elements of the body image are part of the self-
concept in Declarative Memory [Ramamurthy et al., 2012]. The body image can
in°uence and modulate the body schema (see Sec. 3.3 below), but they remain dis-
tinct systems, and human studies have shown that they are underlain by di®erent
neurological streams [Dijkerman and De Haan, 2007; Gallagher, 2005; Paillard,
1999].
The philosophical, psychological, and neuroscienti¯c literature on the body
schema does not make a distinction between the short-term and long-term memory
aspects of the body schema, nor does it make a place for the functional role
of consciousness. LIDA, however, implements functional consciousness (based on
Global Workspace Theory), and a model that integrates consciousness will need to
distinguish several separate aspects of the body schema. The body schema in humans
contains not only an online model of posture and e®ector positions, but it also stores
the habitual capacities of the body and its e®ectors [Gallagher, 2005]. This is how, for
example, a phantom limb can persist even in the absence of proprioceptive feedback.
Any long-term memory must be learned through a conscious broadcast. The Current
Body Schema's online model of e®ector positions, however, does not require con-
sciousness to model movement, although it can be brought to consciousness. It does,
however, require consciousness in order to learn.
The body schema guides an embodied agent's interactions with the world. It
models aspects of the body that are relevant to acting in the world [Graziano and
Webb, 2015]. Without a body schema, simple movements such as walking, for
example, would be rendered exceedingly di±cult, because the agent would not know
the positions of its limbs. LIDA agents with e®ectors or simulated e®ectors (i.e., in a
simulated environment) have a body and hence will sometimes bene¯t from a body
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schema. An e®ector is an actuator that \assert[s] physical forces on the environment"
[Russell and Norvig, 2016, p. 196]. Software agents may have actuators that do not
realize physical force, such as generating text. Basically, a LIDA agent that acts on a
physical environment (and hence is embodied), or on a simulated environment [Dong
and Franklin, 2015; Madl et al., 2016], may need a body schema. But software agents
that do not act on the physical environment or a simulated equivalent, such as
Medical Agent X (MAX) [Strain and Franklin, 2011; Strain et al., 2014], do not need
a body schema.
3.1. The current body schema in the preconscious workspace
The Current Body Schema is part of the preconscious Workspace, interacting with the
CSM (see Fig. 3). The CSM can represent aspects of a LIDA agent's external
environment as well as its internal environment, including memories, desires, plans,
and other items. External items are labeled ‘real,' while many internal items are labeled
‘virtual.' Most of the objects represented in the CSM are about environmental objects,
such as a visual scene in humans. For an agent that moves or locomotes, its environ-
ment continually changes from its perspective. For example, the contents of con-
sciousness continually shift as a human agent progressively moves by a chair, a sofa,
and a table in a room. If it closes its eyes, most of the visual contents of consciousness
will very rapidly disappear. The corresponding representations in the CSM, however,
remain until they decay away. However, when the agent moves out of the room, those
items will likely decay out of the CSM in the absence of reinforcement. The content
may decay within a few seconds for humans, but that duration ultimately depends on
the kind of agent in question and the nature of the environment. The Current Body
Schema shares these features of the CSM, but is marked by two important di®erences:
(1) Most of its contents are persistently represented. The agent's body and e®ectors
largely remain the same throughout its existence, while the contents of the CSM
typically change with changing environments and situations.
(2) Its contents are automatically labeled ‘self.' As a result, it rarely confuses its own
body with the rest of the world.
The Current Body Schema is continually updated with incoming proprioceptive
and vestibular information. It is a system composed of both a long-term and short-
term memory component. The long-term memory component stores e®ector vari-
ables such as the angles of joints. E®ector variables may be innate (or programmed),
or they may be learned through continual reinforcement by proprioceptive infor-
mation from conscious broadcasts. The second component of the Current Body
Schema system is a form of short-term memory, storing the values of e®ector var-
iables.e These values continually change as e®ector positions shift in space. Variables
eEvery autonomous agent must have actuators, but immobile agents (whether in a virtual or real world)
have no e®ectors. Because of this, they may not need a body schema.
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may model the angles between joints (e.g., between human synovial joints) or
directionality for swivel joints (e.g., human cartilaginous joints), but some e®ectors
do not have joints at all. For example, the tongue and lips, used in speech production,
are modeled with e®ector variables without joint angles. Octopus tentacles are
another example of e®ectors modeled without joint angles. Variables' values change
rapidly as an agent interacts with the world, and they also rapidly decay. In Fig. 3, we
label the Current Body Schema as short-term memory to emphasize the continual
update of e®ector variables that occurs as it models the agent's body, but the reader
should keep in mind that it is a system composed of both a long-term memory for
e®ector variables and a short-term memory for the values of these variables (see
Fig. 5).
In the sustained absence of proprioceptive feedback, the Current Body Schema
may no longer be able to track the agent's body, or some subset of joints or variables.
For example, it is common for humans to experience a limb \going to sleep". This
occurs when blood circulation is temporarily cut o® from a limb, such as by sitting
on it. The variables representing the angles between the limb's joints decay, and the
CSM temporarily ceases to model the a®ected part of the limb. Visual feedback (body
image) may be needed in order to coordinate walking until sensation has been
restored.
A more radical decay of both variable and joint representations in the Current
Body Schema can be seen in the case of Ian Waterman. Waterman was a®ected by a
neuropathy that caused him to lose proprioceptive and tactile feedback in most of his
body [McNeill et al., 2010]. He gradually regained the ability to walk, use his arms
and hands, and engage in many everyday activities. However, this was a functional
rehabilitation that operated using di®erent cognitive structures from those typically
Fig. 5. The Current Body Schema is a system composed of long-term and short-term components. The
Current Body Schema is labeled simply as short-term memory in Figs. 2 and 6 for simplicity, pointing out
that its most important aspect is modeling the agent's body as it moves.
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undergirding bodily motion. Waterman used the body image, in the sense of visual
information about his body, to guide his actions [Gallagher and Cole, 1995]. In LIDA
terms, the joint variables decayed out of the Current Body Schema, since they were
no longer reinforced by incoming proprioceptive feedback. In this sense, Waterman
had a \missing" or \lost" body schema [Gallagher, 2005]. This case highlights the
utility of the Current Body Schema. Although Waterman regained the ability to
walk, he is only able to do so concentrating full attention on his bodily movements
through visual feedback. Typically, walking is an automatized process requiring
infrequent or little attention at all.
The Current Body Schema can be built from the same kinds of content as
structures in the CSM, such as percepts and category links. Despite the content being
the same in kind, the agent does not confuse its own body with its outside environ-
ment. Everything in the Current Body Schema is recognized as ‘self,' for example, by
associations with a \self-node" as in PAM. LIDA integrates three levels of selfhood:
the protoself, the minimal self, and the extended self (see Sec. 3.3) [Ramamurthy
et al., 2012; Ryan et al., 2020]. The Current Body Schema is part of the protoself. The
protoself in human agents involves neural representations of the body [Damasio,
1999].
The content of the Current Body Schema includes the rapidly updated positions,
size, and pressure information of the agent's e®ectors. This information is cued into
the CSM when a relevant item appears. For example, a human agent may receive a
visual stimulus from a doorknob. The sensory information generated by this stimulus
is sent to the preconscious Workspace. If the object is recognized as a doorknob in
PAM, an object node for the doorknob can be sent into the CSM as part of a percept.
An action node may also be activated in PAM, e.g., a ‘turning' action. This turning
action is part of the Habitual Body Schema (see Sec. 3.2). The action is not a full
speci¯cation of the scheme or motor plan of the turning motion. Rather, it is simply
the knowledge that the agent is able to perform that action. Additionally, the agent's
hand is activated in PAM as part of the body image by association with the doorknob
node. As a result, a®ordances related to the doorknob are recognized in PAM,
suggesting possible bodily actions. Next, the Current Body Schema can be cued for
e®ector variables and their values, as they are rapidly changing online. We have
presented this as if these are sequential steps, but this is only for the convenience of
explanation. The activation of the object, action, and hand in PAM, and the acti-
vation of the current joint positions and variables of the hand and its digits from the
Current Body Schema, are all cued from the CSM.
An event in a LIDA agent is a structure usually composed of three or more nodes,
often with the following thematic role links: (1) agent, (2) action, (3) object, and (for
embodied actions) (4) instrument [McCall et al., 2010]. In our example, the agent is
‘self,' the action is ‘turn,' the object is the doorknob, and the instrument is ‘hand'.
Incoming ventral stream information from Sensory Memory activates an event node
that was previously learned into PAM, including the agent, action, object, and
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instrument. The entire event is part of the Habitual Body Schema (see Sec. 3.2).f If
the event's activation is high enough, it can be copied into in the CSM. The hand that
is part of this event then cues the Current Body Schema. As a result of this cueing
process, the unbound variables that are part of the hand node in the CSM can be
fNot all events in PAM are part of the Habitual Body Schema; only those incorporating bodily e®ectors in
the instrument role are.
Fig. 6. An event is recognized in PAM. The event consists of an agent role (self), an action role (turn), an
object role (doorknob), and an instrument role (hand). This event is part of the Habitual Body Schema
(marked in green). The event recognized in PAM is then sent as part of a percept into the CSM. In the
CSM, the variables in the event structures are then bound with values, including those for the hand.
Depending on how the programmer wishes to implement a speci¯c LIDA agent, this could be done by
structure building codelets, or the module could do the binding. The values for the hand used to bind the
hand node in the CSM are cued from the Current Body Schema.
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associated with the corresponding values from the part of the Current Body Schema
that could be identi¯ed in PAM as a hand. This speci¯es the exact context, position,
and articulation of the hand (see Fig. 6). Once in the CSM, these values now
associated with the hand node will be used to cue other long-term memory modules.
For example, for those who use sign language, the speci¯cs of hand orientation can be
associated with the recognition of words in PAM, and it can cue associated infor-
mation from Declarative Memory.
For a human agent, who has the embodied capacity to turn a doorknob, the
doorknob a®ords turnability. This requires that the agent has previously learned the
a®ordance, such as through exploration or cultural learning. The a®ordances an
agent perceives are always relative to the embodied capacities of that agent. For
example, a cat typically does not perceive a turnability a®ordance in a doorknob.
This is because the structure of their paw is not suitable for grasping, twisting, and
pulling that is required to open with it. The cat's Habitual Body Schema has no
stored memory of such bodily capacities, and so they cannot be cued to the CSM.
Nevertheless, this does not absolutely prevent an agent from recognizing a®ordances
for other kinds of agents.
The agent's current size is not measured in centimeters or inches. For example, if a
human agent knows it can ¯t through a door, it is not because it cued from
Declarative Memory the fact that it is e.g., 170 cm tall, and compares that to the
height in centimeters of the doorway, which anyway is usually unknown. Rather, it
has an embodied sense of its size in relation to other objects. Typically, current size
and accustomed size (which is a long-term memory held in the Habitual Body
Schema) will match up. However, discrepancies will arise when e.g., a human agent
wears platform shoes or high heels, or when a tool becomes incorporated into its
Current Body Schema (see Sec. 4).
Structures in the Current Body Schema are not capable of directly being broad-
cast because the module is not part of the CSM, and so attention codelets do not see
it. Structures that are cued into the CSM, however, may form parts of coalitions that
compete for conscious broadcast. If a model of an e®ector wins the competition for
broadcast, the e®ector variables and their values can be used by Procedural Memory
and Sensory Motor Memory. Procedural Memory is the ¯rst stage of the action phase
of the cognitive cycle, and its data structure is the scheme. An important aspect of
schemes is that they are contextually sensitive (the scheme consists of a context,
action, and result). Schemes that are bound with variables from conscious broadcasts
are copied into Action Selection as behaviors. Procedural Memory may use broadcast
e®ector values to help determine the scheme's context, action, and result. For
example, the position of the hands is important in determining whether an agent can
turn a doorknob.
In each cognitive cycle, Sensory Motor Memory receives the winning behavior
from Action Selection, which can also utilize broadcast e®ector values to help
determine the motor plan template. The motor plan template is a skeletal outline
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towards a concrete motor plan. The e®ector values, which ultimately come from the
agent's model of its own body in the Current Body Schema, are fully speci¯ed in the
behavior. However, by the time the cognitive cycle has moved from early processing
of the stimulus in Sensory Memory to Sensory Motor Memory, for many LIDA agents
many milliseconds (hundreds in the case of humans) will have already passed. The
object in the environment that the agent intends to act upon may have slightly
changed its position or orientation in the interim. To prevent a disconnect between
action and the environment due to this lag, dorsal stream information feeds directly
into Motor Plan Execution. The motor plan generated by Sensory Motor Memory
can have some of its variables updated within Motor Plan Execution by the dorsal
stream information of the Online Body Schema. This is consistent with neu-
ropsychological evidence that patients with damage to object categorization pro-
cesses are still able to adjust for changes in orientation when performing tasks
[Goodale et al., 1991].
The dorsal stream information about e®ectors di®ers from the information mod-
eled by the Current Body Schema insofar as the former (1) does not form a full bodily
model, but instead consists of localized and unintegrated information, and (2) is not
capable of being consciously broadcast. As we saw in Sec. 1.1, the ‘body schema' in
humans is underlain by two separate neural pathways, and the unconscious pathway
(analogous to the dorsal visual stream) runs from the thalamus to the posterior
parietal cortex in humans. LIDA does not label this \dorsal" stream information as
part of the body schema, but it is important to keep in mind that LIDA does account
for this aspect of the body schema. In LIDA, the ‘body schema' similarly uses both
dorsal and ventral stream information (which in LIDA are not necessarily neural in
nature). In other words, the ‘body schema' as it is presented in many scienti¯c and
philosophical accounts [e.g., Gallagher, 2005] is realized in LIDA partially through
aspects that are capable of becoming preconscious (Current Body Schema, Habitual
Body Schema) and partially through the dorsal stream.
3.2. The habitual body schema
While the Current Body Schema continually tracks e®ector variables and their values
including the angles between joints in human agents, the Habitual Body Schema is a
uni¯ed collection of the body's capabilities and capacities for action, learned a®or-
dances, and accustomed weight and size. While the Current Body Schema has a long-
term memory component, it only stores e®ector variables. Embodied capacities for
action are recognitional. Upon seeing an a®ordance, an agent may recognize that it
has the embodied capacity to act on that a®ordance. PAM is LIDA's recognitional
memory, and the Habitual Body Schema is a label for that part of PAM that stores
embodied capacities and a®ordances.
The Habitual Body Schema helps an agent to e®ectively maneuver its body during
various tasks by storing its actions and capacities for use in modeling within the
CSM. The knowledge that is stored in the Habitual Body Schema does not consist of
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detailed plans of how to implement an action with an e®ector. Actions are speci¯ed
and become progressively more detailed as they develop from schemes, to behaviors,
to motor plans (see Sec. 2.3). Just as the Current Body Schema does not model every
minute part of the agent's real body, but instead only aspects of the body related to
the control of its e®ectors, the Habitual Body Schema does not model the detailed
implementations of actions, but only the broad capacities for action. The actual
moving of the e®ectors is accomplished in the action and learning phase, and the
capacities stored in the Habitual Body Schema are used to help with the simulation of
that action prior to it being carried out.
The Habitual Body Schema instead contains events which include a bodily
e®ector in the instrumental thematic role (see Fig. 6). Actions such as grasping,
climbing, or turning, are learned into the Habitual Body Schema as parts of events
through conscious broadcasts. For example, if an agent learns a new skill such as
opening a door, the Habitual Body Schema will be updated to re°ect this new
embodied capacity for action. Modules related to action, including Procedural
Memory and Sensory Motor Memory, may also be updated to re°ect the new skill,
resulting in modi¯ed or new behaviors and motor plans. A single conscious broadcast
may include an agent's trying of a new action for the ¯rst time, such as turning a
doorknob. The conscious broadcast becomes available to other LIDA modules,
including PAM, where the Habitual Body Schema resides. Many skills require mul-
tiple trials in order to reinforce a new action node in the Habitual Body Schema. In
this way, the Habitual Body Schema builds a repertoire of skills as the agent engages
with the world over time.
Weight is an example of something that is realized by the interaction of the
Current Body Schema and the Habitual Body Schema in the CSM. Weight is not
directly measured in the Current Body Schema, but it can instantiate a copy of the
pressure sensations it receives into the CSM, where it can be interpreted as weight.
The current size and weight of the body and e®ectors are not measured in standard
units of measurement. For example, we can put on a heavy backpack. We will feel
encumbered by the weight, and have a sense that our body is heavier than it usually
is. We will rightly attribute this di®erence to the backpack. This intuitive sense of a
change in weight is not measured in kilograms or pounds. We may know our weight,
e.g., 73 kg. It is possible that we may also know the combined weight of ourselves plus
the backpack, e.g., 93 kg. This semantic knowledge is not primarily what makes us
feel encumbered. Rather the current weight we are referring to here is a bodily feeling.
Although semantic knowledge can in°uence our sense of how heavy something is, the
linguistic token ‘93 kg' is di®erent in kind from the feeling of heaviness. The feeling of
weight is only approximately related to our weight in kilograms.
Pressure information from Sensory Memory feeds directly into the CSM, the
Current Body Schema, and PAM. PAM, as a recognitional memory, is where weight
is recognized. However, PAM is not directly able to determine weight from pressure
information it receives from Sensory Memory. This is because weight is a contextual
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feeling, and pressure can be interpreted in other ways depending on context. For
example, pressure in a fast vehicle or spaceship may be interpreted as acceleration, or
pressure on an arm when a human punches a wall may be interpreted as force. As
part of its recognition, PAM interprets the pressure as weight (the context is part of
the recognitional process). Once PAM recognizes weight, it can then be sent as part
of a percept back up to the CSM. The feeling of weight (or acceleration, or however
the pressure information is interpreted) can then be consciously broadcast if it is
selected by an attention codelet into a coalition that wins the competition for global
conscious broadcast. That corresponds to our conscious sense of weight. The di®er-
ence should be intuitive: our conscious awareness of how heavy we feel when we put
on a heavy backpack is not the same thing as our awareness of our saying, or sub-
vocalizing, the sentence, \I weigh 73 kg."
3.3. Body image
As previouslymentioned, ‘body image' is an umbrella term referring to representations
of the agent's body that are not proprioceptive, vestibular, or a®ective, and some of its
diverse functions are biologically realized by two separate neural pathways in humans
[Dijkerman and De Haan, 2007]. It is not a model or uni¯ed collection like the body
schema.Many semantic representations of the body, for humans, are deeply embedded
in social distinctions, hierarchy, competition, and mating, and can be a signi¯cant
source of pride or distress. These include representations, on a positive to negative
scale, of attractiveness, weight, height, athleticism, and so forth. Several psychological
disorders, such as anorexia, bulimia, and body dysmorphic disorder, are essentially
disorders of the body image. Theymay incorporate both negative semantic body image
and negative visual or imaginative body image.
In LIDA, following Global Workspace Theory, the semantic elements of the body
image are part of the self-concept. The self-concept is an aspect of the Extended Self.
The self-concept, or selfplex [Blackmore, 2000], includes an agent's beliefs about
themselves [Baars, 2019; Ramamurthy et al., 2012; Ryan et al., 2020]. There are also
visual and imaginative aspects of the body image [Gallagher, 2005], and these are
likely widely distributed across the kingdom Animalia, more so than semantic
aspects. These can include sensory and perceptual experiences of their own bodies,
such as how their bodies visually appear, smell, taste, and feel, as well as mental
simulations of those experiences. Any agent that has the capacity to sense its own
body through modalities other than proprioceptive and vestibular means can have at
least a minimal body image. By contrast, the Current Body Schema is marked as part
of the protoself.
4. The Plasticity of the Current Body Schema and Phantom Limbs
As we noted (Sec. 1.1), the body schema is, under the right conditions, plastic and
able to extend out into external objects. This only happens in situations where an
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object, such as a tool, is repeatedly utilized by an agent over a period of time.
Maravita and Iriki [2004] documented the neuroplastic shift in body schema rep-
resentations for macaques when they were trained to use a reaching tool, over a
period of two weeks, to grab and eat fruit. A more classic example is of a blind man,
whose cane has become an extended part of his body schema [Merleau-Ponty, 1945/
2012]. In LIDA, the Current Body Schema is a component that is plastic. The
Habitual Body Schema can also incorporate novel capacities or the a®ordances that
tools enable, and in that sense can also be \extended." However, this is not a literal
extension, since the Habitual Body Schema is not a model (since it does not include
any processes), but rather is a collection of capabilities.
When a LIDA agent uses a tool, e.g., a food-grasping tool [as in Maravita and Iriki,
2004, the Current Body Schema begins to incorporate that tool into its model of the
body. Upon using a tool once, that tool can be learned into the Current Body Schema
as a new variable (in the module's long-term memory component) through a con-
scious broadcast, and will have a very low activation. This is an instance of the
pro°igate learning that occurs in LIDA agents [Franklin et al., 2016]. Old variable
values become associated with this new variable. For example, when a cane is learned
into the blind man's Current Body Schema, there are no new sensors. Values gen-
erated by sensors (such as pressures in the hand) get associated with the cane.
Without reinforcement, however, it rapidly decays out of the Current Body Schema.
Once tools or other objects in the CSM become incorporated into the Current Body
Schema, they are automatically labeled as ‘self.' The model of the agent's body and
e®ectors incorporates the extraneous implement. The tapping sounds of the cane,
used for spatial navigation, are not proprioceptive, and are processed in the CSM.
As Merleau-Ponty notes, \The blind man's stick . . . has become an area of sen-
sitivity, extending the scope and active radius of touch, and providing a parallel to
sight" [Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2012, p. 165]. What Merleau-Ponty describes is the
shift that the tool makes from a pure object into an extension of the agent's own hand
or arm. In a LIDA agent, not only does the stick become an extension of the agent's
body, but it also retains its status as an object, as well. The agent can shift its
disposition towards the cane, and look at it purely as an object, because it is still
represented in the long-term memory modules as an object. Although a tool, such as a
food grasper or a cane, has no proprioceptive sensors, information about its position is
readily available through the sensors of the e®ector that is manipulating the tool, and
possibly other sensors. As previously mentioned (Sec. 3), e®ectors in the Current
Body Schema can be learned into it  speci¯cally, into its long-term memory
component (see Fig. 5). The plastic incorporation of tools into the Current Body
Schema is an instance of such learning.
An object node for a cane in PAM can be cued into the CSM, where it can be
linked with existing e®ector variables by structure building codelets, and so become a
new e®ector structure. If it is selected by attention codelets and eventually wins the
competition for conscious broadcast, the Current Body Schema may access it and
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write a new variable for it in its long-term memory component. At this point, the
structure becomes a new e®ector. This is a form of instructionalist learning, which
occurs when new structures are learned into a module as a result of a conscious
broadcast. That new variable will then either decay out or be reinforced.
Reinforcement occurs through selectionist learning, wherein the base-level activation
of structures is strengthened through further conscious content. If the variable is
reinforced enough, it may become a permanent or at least long-enduring entity
within the Current Body Schema. For example, the macaques studied by Maravita
and Iriki [2004] only incorporated the food grabber into their body schemas after a
full two weeks of repeated trials of using the tool to grab food.
When the tool is integrated into and augments the Current Body Schema, it only
extends the latter while it is actively being used. Once the tool is dropped, the
Current Body Schema stops modeling the extended e®ector. The variables associated
with the tool cease to have values in the short-term memory component of the
Current Body Schema, but they remain in the long-term memory component. If
the tool is picked back up again, the Current Body Schema once again models the
extended e®ector. The variables do not typically decay out of the long-term memory
component, possibly unless it has not been reinforced in a very long time. The short-
term memory component, however, registers no incoming information concerning the
variables' current positions. In the absence of this information, it is unable to model
those variables in action. Hence, the extended e®ector seems to \disappear" when the
tool is no longer in use, but it can rapidly \reappear" once incoming information is
again received.
There is typically no proprioceptive information that directly comes from an
object that is incorporated into the Current Body Schema. What changes is the way
sensations are interpreted. A cane, for example, has no sensors. The e®ector or
e®ectors that are directly in contact with the cane (viz., the hand), does have sensors,
however. It is through these sensors that proprioceptive feedback related to the
arti¯cial e®ector comes into the Current Body Schema. For example, when the blind
man's cane bumps against an external object, the physical force is transmitted
through the cane and to the pressure sensors in the hand. The changes in pressure in
the hand used to only be associated with the hand e®ector in the Current Body
Schema. However, some of them now also become associated with the extended cane
e®ector once it has been learned into the Current Body Schema. Additionally, the
sounds produced by the cane's tapping also become associated with the new e®ector.
The Habitual Body Schema is also a®ected and shaped by the repeated utilization
of a certain tool or object over time. New embodied capacities or a®ordances are
learned in PAM, or existing a®ordances become associated with novel objects. For
example, a human agent may become accustomed to using a virtual reality system for
gaming. Many such virtual reality systems utilize manual controllers, which the user
grasps and manipulates in order to interact with objects and events in the virtual
world. Once a gaming controller is used enough, it should become integrated with the
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Current Body Schema [see Maravita and Iriki, 2004]. Controllers often have one or
more buttons, in addition to position sensors. The human agent may want to open a
virtual elevator, or pick up a virtual object. To do so, they would place their hand
near the virtual elevator panel, or near the virtual object. Next, they would press the
button on their controller. These virtual objects have a®ordances, but the a®ordances
are slightly di®erent because they do not involve biological e®ectors. Rather, they
involve the use of the extended, technological e®ector (the controller).
In our model, the phenomenon of phantom limbs typically arises by means very
similar to extended e®ectors, although there may be alternate routes as well, given
the diversity of the phenomenon. A phantom limb is a proprioceptive model of the
variables and values associated with a limb or other body part that has been
amputated, or even one that was never there to begin with (as in congenital aplasia).
The phenomenon occurs for the overwhelming majority of amputees [Halligan, 2002]
(96% of amputees, in one study [Fraser et al., 2001]). For example, a person may have
the feeling of a hand that has been missing for decades. In one study, over half of the
participants reported that they could move their phantom limb like other limbs, and
over a quarter reported that they felt they could manipulate and pick up things with
it [Fraser et al., 2001]. Many cases of phantom limbs seem to be associated with pain,
making them a medical and neuropsychological issue.
Phantom limbs are diverse, with some ¯xed, some movable, and many even
occasionally involving pain [Giummarra et al., 2007]. Some phantoms are not even
limbs at all, such as phantom breasts [Dijkstra et al., 2007]. There may be several
routes to phantom limbs depending on the speci¯cities of the case; we consider a few
of these below, but we do not claim to have exhaustively accounted for every possible
phantom phenomenon. Whereas in the plastic extension of the Current Body
Schema, extended e®ectors variables are learned into the long-term memory com-
ponent of the Current Body Schema, the e®ector variables for phantom limbs are
mostly innate [Halligan, 2002]. That the model of limbs in the long-term component
of the Current Body Schema is largely innate is shown by the existence of people who
report phantom limbs, but who were born with a congenital lack of the limb [Brugger
et al., 2000]. Phantom limbs resemble plastically extended e®ectors, however, insofar
as they both associate already-existing proprioceptive information with a di®erent
e®ector. Phantom limbs get their proprioceptive information from adjacent areas of
the human brain's homunculi or somatotopic maps. For example, \[i]n some patients,
stimulation of selected areas on the face, surviving upper limb or trunk, reliably
produce referred sensations to corresponding parts of the phantom limb" [Halligan,
2002, p. 263; see also Ramachandran et al., 1992]. In addition, some information from
the contralateral limb may a®ect the phantom limb [Giummarra et al., 2007]. In a
LIDA human agent, the e®ector values of such bodily regions would become
associated with the already existing and innate limb variables once they stop
receiving proprioceptive information of their own, in the same way that extended
e®ectors like canes become associated with the values of preexisting variables.
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The phenomenology of the phantom limb would arise when that e®ector and
its associated values are cued into the CSM, for example in order to bind the variables
of an instrument node in an event (which itself originates in PAM). If that hand
node were to be selected by an attention codelet and become part of a coalition, and
that coalition were to win the competition for conscious broadcast, then the
agent would experience that e®ector and its values. For example, they may experi-
ence them as a hand opened up, bunched into a ¯st, and even sensations of pain. The
phenomenology of the phantom will remain proprioceptive, and will lack a visual
phenomenology.
In some cases, the body image may further modulate the phantom limb
phenomenon. This is particularly salient in cases where visual feedback has an e®ect
on the phantom limb. In such cases, visual feedback triggers a \fusion" of the body
image (the perceived limb) with the phantom limb. This occurs frequently with
prosthetic limbs, where the phantom and the prosthesis become merged [Giummarra
et al., 2007]. It has also occurred in surgery. For example, in a study by Melzack and
Bromage [1973], participants had the brachial plexus temporarily anaesthetized.
Nearly all reported a phantom arm within 20 to 40min. The proprioceptive location
of the phantom arm typically lay close to the torso, while their real arm was placed
90 away from the body for surgery. The mismatch between the location of their
phantom arm and their real, anaesthetized arm was corrected when the two \fused"
as participants looked at their real arm. Since the Current Body Schema is pro-
prioceptive and vestibular, it is not a®ected by visual information. The \fusion"
would occur within the CSM. The Current Body Schema would be cued for the
variables and values associated with the phantom arm in the CSM. The body image,
particularly in the form of visual information about the arm within the CSM, will in
this case trigger an update of the values of the phantom arm.
5. The Body Schema in LIDA in Relation to Several Experiments
Having laid out the foundations of the Current Body Schema and the Habitual Body
Schema in LIDA, we will close this paper with a few examples of di±cult cases from
psychological experiments that can be well explained by LIDA. Some researchers
have argued that the body image in humans can in some cases in°uence the body
schema [Gallagher, 2005], especially by virtue of the dominance of the visual
modality, but also through semantic elements. For example, in the rubber hand
illusion, a subject is visually presented with an arti¯cial hand in front of them
[Botvinick and Cohen, 1998]. To begin with, the subject's real arm is hidden from
view. The researcher physically stimulates the subject's arm, and makes the same
stimulating motions over the arti¯cial arm in the subject's visual ¯eld. Many subjects
experience a feeling that their body ownership is of the rubber hand, and a common
explanation is that, through visual dominance, a transfer of the body schema to the
arti¯cial arm was made. As Gallagher [2013] notes, while the feeling of the body
seems to transfer to the rubber hand, the motor aspects of the hand are not typically
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subject to the same illusion. The variables in the Current Body Schema do not undergo
an alteration. The subject still receives proprioceptive information from Sensory
Memory. It is within the CSM, rather than in the Current Body Schema, that the
rubber hand illusion would take e®ect. The activated hand in the Current Body
Schema is interpreted in the CSM as the visually recognized hand activated in PAM.
Generally, structure building codelets attempt to build hypotheses to best interpret the
situation within the CSM. The interpretation in this case is, of course, mistaken, giving
rise to the illusion. The structure building codelets build an interpretation that the
hand the agent is seeing is the agent's own hand. This is a hypothesis that has probably
always held true prior to the agent's entering into the arti¯cial laboratory conditions.
The Current Body Schema only receives pressure and vestibular information from
Sensory Memory. Feelings are activated in PAM and can be interpreted, based on
contextual factors, as being feelings about the agent's own hand. In other words, the
body image does not truly modulate the body schema in this case.
Another case of the purported in°uence of body image on body schema was ¯rst
discovered by Nielsen [1963] [see Gallagher, 2005]. In this experiment, subjects were
instructed to draw a straight line. Their vision was altered in a device such that they
actually saw an experimenter's hand, which they mistakenly identi¯ed as their own
(similar to the rubber hand illusion). The experimenter then began to veer and curve
the line drawn. Subjects experienced a mismatch between their proprioceptive sense
of drawing a straight line and their visual body image of their hand (or what they
misidenti¯ed as their hand). Several subjects
\described that they felt something strange and queer outside themselves,
which pressed their hand to the right or resisted their free mobility. They
suggested that ‘magnets,' ‘unidenti¯ed forces,' ‘invisible traces under the
paper,' or the like, could be the cause" [Nielsen, 1963, p. 228].
The Current Body Schema, of course, does not receive any pressure or other
information from Sensory Memory related to being forced or moved, since that feeling
is an illusion. Rather, an event is recognized in PAM. That event consists of:
. force or natural cause thematic role: magnet, unidenti¯ed force, etc.
. action thematic role: push
. object thematic role: self (I am pushed)
. subject thematic role: hand
In natural language, this event is ‘My hand is being pushed by a magnet.' The
Current Body Schema is a model of the variables and values associated with
the hand, and is cued from the CSM. PAM sends the event as part of a percept to the
CSM, where its remaining unbound variables can be bound. This includes the vari-
ables for the hand that takes the subject thematic role, variables which are bound
using the copy of the hand-associated variables and values from the Current Body
Schema (cf. Fig. 6). Meanwhile, PAM is receiving pressure information from Sensory
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Memory. The interpretation it makes of this pressure information depends on the
event that is activated. If the event is ‘My hand is being pushed by a magnet,' the
pressure information may be interpreted as the feeling of an external force. The event
that is activated, however, depends on the cultural background of the agent. If the
event is ‘My hand is being controlled by a demon,' a culturally plausible interpret-
ation in some societies, then the pressure information would still be interpreted as the
feeling of an external force, but that feeling would have a negative a®ective valence
(it would be scary). If the feeling, as part of the percept, becomes part of a winning
coalition, it can be consciously broadcast. In this way, the agent will consciously feel
and be able to report being pushed by an outside force, even though no related
information is being received in the Current Body Schema that would indicate such
a force.
New Caledonian crows (Corvus moneduloides) have an ability to manufacture
basic hook-like tools [Hunt, 1996; Taylor et al., 2007]. In one experiment, researchers
originally provided di®erently shaped wires with the aim of seeing whether a crow
would ¯gure out how to bend a wire to manufacture a similar tool to that which they
make in the wild [Weir et al., 2002]. The crow took the straight wire and bent it to
make a hook. Although these corvids are known to make hook-like tools, this case
demonstrated remarkable intelligence due to the novelty of the environment and the
strangeness of the material (wire). This was later replicated with larger samples [Rutz
et al., 2016]. In the LIDA model, the crow would need to recognize its embodied
capacities and the a®ordances available in the wire. It may learn the a®ordances of
the wire through brief experimentation, but its embodied capacities are stored in the
Habitual Body Schema. These capacities include the ability to bite and manipulate
things with its beak and feet. Both the object's a®ordances (once learned) and its
embodied capacities (and their associated e®ectors) are recognized in PAM based on
incoming information from Sensory Memory, and cues from the CSM. Once acti-
vated, they can be copied into structures in the CSM (viz., percepts). Structure
building codelets may assemble the embodied capacities and their associated e®ec-
tors, the wire (also recognized in PAM), and the a®ordance link from the wire to the
embodied capacity or solicitation to action (e.g., a graspability a®ordance) all
together into a structure. The Current Body Schema contributes with an updated
model of the beak's and foot's current positions. If attention codelets pick this
structure out as salient, it may win the competition for a conscious broadcast, and
eventually lead to actions being selected for and performed in the action and learning
phase of a cognitive cycle.
6. Conclusion
This paper has laid out the conceptual foundations of the body schema, as well as the
body image, in LIDA, a functionally conscious cognitive architecture that compu-
tationally implements and °eshes out Globally Workspace Theory. Body schema has
been an object of inquiry since the early 1900s and recent advances have been made in
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our knowledge of the underlying neural structures supporting it. What LIDA can
contribute is an understanding of how an agent might computationally implement
such a structure. Additionally, LIDA, as a computational implementation of Global
Workspace Theory, can contribute to the study of the body schema by re¯ning that
concept into three separate functions, based on the functional role of consciousness in
cognition. The Current Body Schema models the agent's e®ectors, whose positions
are continually updated, while the Habitual Body Schema is a uni¯ed collection of
the embodied capacities for action that the agent has, either through programming,
evolution, or learning. Additionally, the Current Body Schema does not solely rely on
a conscious broadcast for updating, whereas the Habitual Body Schema relies on
conscious broadcasts for updating. The ¯nal function is the Online Body Schema,
which incorporates \dorsal" stream, never-conscious aspects of the ‘body schema,'
such as highly granular e®ector positions that are used in online control [cf.
Gallagher, 2005]. This information is not integrated into a model, and feeds directly
from Sensory Memory to the Sensory Motor System.
We believe these distinctions within LIDA ought to hold for biological agents, as
well. The embodied capacities of an agent must be functionally di®erent from the
online modeling of their e®ectors because of the di®erent ways they are updated. Since
the Habitual Body Schema updates through conscious broadcasts, it can only update
at most once per cognitive cycle. The Current Body Schema's long-term memory
component, which stores variables such as joints and e®ectors, can similarly be
updated through conscious broadcasts. However, the bulk of the Current Body
Schema's work is in the online modeling of current e®ector positions (viz., the values of
variables). This updating is continuous and does not solely rely on conscious broad-
casts. In sum, the idea that there is ‘a body schema' is untenable, according to a Global
Workspace Theory of consciousness. There is a continually updated proprioceptive and
vestibular model of the body, a long-term memory of embodied capacities and e®ectors,
and an online coupling of the sensorimotor system from early perception.
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